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COMMENT.
Since our last issue, two decisions of great importance, each
based on a different Act of Congress, but both tending in the same
direction and springing from circumstances similar in general
features, have been rendered by the United States courts. That
of Judge Ricks of the Circuit Court, delivered in Ohio, was the
result of a suit instituted by the Toledo, Ann Arbor & N. Mich.
R. R. against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. R. et. al.,
to compel them to deliver to the complainant freight and cars, in
transit from one State to another, and then on the defendant's
line. The bill brought depended on the third section of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, which provides, that it shall be unlawful for
"any common carrier, subject to this act * * to subject
any particular * * * company * * to any undue
* * * prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
A mandatory injunction was therefore issued by Judge Ricks,
at chambers, enjoining the defendant, "their officers, agents, ser-
vants, and employ6s," from so refusing to deliver any interstate
freight billed over the complainant's road. The court holds, that
"it had authority to thus proceed against the servants of the
defendants," for since a corporation can only act through its
agents, a mandatory law, like the Interstate Commerce Act, must
apply to the servants as well as to the corporation itself. Besides,
the defendant's refusal to deliver the said freight, etc., was due to
their employ6s, who had declined to handle it, on account of a boy-
cott which their labor organization had declared against the com-
plainant, to assist the complainant's workmen, then out on a strike.
The mandates of the court were duly served on the defendants
and were by them communicated to their employ6s, certain of
whom, remaining in the defendant's service deliberately disobeyed
them and were, on application from the defendants, attached to
answer for contempt by order of the court. It was claimed that
such an order was without precedent, but on this point the court
says, "Every just order or rule known to Equity Courts was born
of some emergency to meet some new conditions and was there-
fore in its time, without a precedent. If based on sound princi-
ples and beneficent results follow their enforcement, affording
necessary relief to the one party without imposing illegal burdens
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on the other, new remedies and unprecedented orders are not
unwelcome aids to the chancellor to meet the constantly varying
demands for equitable relief." It was in consideration of the
question as to the guilt of the men however, that the more strik-
ing points of the opinion appear.
The couit holds, that under ordinary conditions the right of
the employ6 to quit his employer's service cannot be restrained
by a Court of Equity and that the employer's sole remedy is a suit
for damages, but that this right is modified where the employer is
a public corporation charged with public trusts. "The suspen-
sion of work on the line of such a vast railroad, by the arbitrary
action of the body of its engineers and firemen would paralyze the
business of the entire country, entailing loss'es and bringing dis-
aster to thousands of unoffending citizens." In this particular
case the employ6 s knew that their refusal would not only result in
this calamity, to the public but would cause their employer to
violate the orders of the court and thus render himself liable to
heavy penalties. They therefore owed the corporation "a higher
duty than though their services had been to a private person,"
and an attempt to make* such a combined action in aid of
striking workmen on another road, without any grievance of their
own, might be restrained by the courts, as might any " acts, or
commission of violence, or intimidation, or the enforcement of
rules and regulations of organizations, which result in irremediable
injuries to their employers and to the public."
But while the court thus emphatically asserts its right to
compel an employ 6 while in such service to perform the duties of
his position, it disclaims any power to force an individual to
remain in the employment, when he honestly desires to .leave it,
adding, "the circumstances when this freedom to quit the service
continues, and when it terminates, it is not now necessary to
determine, but there certainly are times and conditions when such
right must be denied." It is certain, however, that a combination
to leave in order to injure the public and so oppress the employer
is criminal, and a Court of Equity may protect the public and
employer by preventing "an employ
6 from quitting the service
in which he is engaged, solely as a means of carrying out his part
in such conspiracy and for no other purpose than to aid in enforce-
ing such a boycott."
The second decision referred to, is that rendered by Judge
Billings of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
(The U. S. v. The Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New
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Orleans, La., etaL., No. 12,1 43). This also was the result of an
application for an injunction to prevent the carrying out of a boy-
cott, but the statute relied on in this case is found in United States
Statutes, Vol. 26, p. 209, and is entitled "an act to protect trade
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." The
first section provides, that "every contract or combination, in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations is
hereby declared illegal." This act has usually been regarded as
having been passed to prevent combinations of capitalists, not of
laborers; and on this point Judge Billings, in the course of his
decision, says, "it seems to me, its meaning as far as relates to
the sort of combinations to which it is to apply is manifest, and
that it includes combinations which are composed of laborers act-
ing in the interest of laborers." The circumstances which led to
the application for the injunction were these. A dispute had
arisen between the warehousemen, and draymen and their
employ6s, and a general strike was ordered by the heads of the
labor organizations to compel the employers to accede to the
wishes of the workmen, while non-uiion men were prevented by
intimidation from taking the striker's places. This resulted in a
cessation of traffic and a consequent stoppage of freight in progress
"from State to State, and to and from foreign nations." The
court holds, that such a combination to control the employment of
none but union men when interstate or foreign commerce is
restrained thereby, is such a conspiracy or combination as is
included by the statute. Labor organizations may be in them-
selves lawful but when they are used for an unlawful purpose
they become themselves unlawful and may be restrained. "The
evil as well as the unlawfulness of the act of the defendants con-
sists in this, that until certain demands of theirs were complied
with, they endeavored to prevent and did prevent everybody from
moving the commerce of the country. * * * It is the success-
ful effort of the combination of the defendants to overawe others
who were at work in conducting or carrying on the commerce of
the country, in which the court finds their error and their viola-
tion of the statute. * * * For these reasons I think the
injunction should issue." It will be noticed that the results of
this decision may be even more far-reaching in its consequences
than that of Judge Ricks, and the question as to what constitutes
"a restraint of trade," under the statute, is liable to become one
as full of difficulty for the courts as its correct decision will be of
importance to the community.
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A recent Virginia case (City of Norfolk v. Chamberlain, i6 S. E.
Rep. 73o ) brings up the very interesting question as to how far a
municipality may go in making improvements, such as sidewalks
and sewers, and compel the owners of property abutting on the
improved streets to pay for them. In this case the city council of
Norfolk took by condemnation proceedings almost half of a
vacant corner lot in order to widen one of the streets. The
remaining part was practically valueless, being- a very narrow
strip along the newly widened street the entire depth of the orig-
inal lot. The city council next voted to build a sewer through this
street, and assessed the narrow strip for betterments considerably
more than was paid for the part taken under the condemnation
proceedings. An injunction restrained the collection of the
assessment and the Supreme Court made the injunction perpetual.
The general doctrine is that where needed improvements are
made the owners of property specially benefited should bear a
-greater proportion of the expense than the general tax-payer.
This doctrine, however, is rather flexible as applied in the several
States. New York takes the strongest ground in favor of local
assessments in the early and now leading case of People v. Mayor
of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, which seems to be based upon the idea
that the legislature is possessed of inherent and absolute power
over the subject of taxation, and may therefore arbitrarily dis-
tribute the burdens of taxation, or authorize municipal corpora-
tions to do so. This strong ground is denied in Illinois (Chicago
v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203, and Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 Ill. 2xi), but it is
conceded that assessments may be made for actual benefits, the
balance to be paid by general taxation. Pennsylvania takes prac-
tically the same ground in Hammett v. Philadelohia, 65 Pa. St. 146,
the Case of W ashington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352, and Seely v. Pitts-
burgh, 82 Pa. St. 36o.
In McBean v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee approved the Illinois decisions and held that it is beyond
the power of the legislature to authorize a municipality to pave
its streets and charge the cost thereof on the adjoining lots in
proportion to their frontage. And even in New York in the later
case of Guest v. Brooklyn, 69 N. Y. 506, the system as authorized
and practiced in New York and Brooklyn is condemned as
"unjust and oppressive, unsound in principle,, and vicious in
practice."
The Virginia case, supra, in a very elaborate opinion discuss-
ing the whole system of local assessments, declares the doctrine
to be untenable and the principle unsound, capable of being made
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the means of indirect confiscation of property without compensa-
tion, and, in fact, often so used by over-zealous or unscrupulous
city councils.
In the case of Matthews et al. v. D ubuque Mattress Co. et al.,
reported in 54 N. W. Rep. 225, the Supreme Court of Iowa has
rendered a decision upon a very close question. The original
action was upon a promissory note which read, "We promise to
pay," etc., and was signed " Dubuque Mattress Co., John Kapp,
Pt." The lower court held that the note was binding upon Kapp
personally and that even between the original parties parol evi-
dence was not admissible to show that the plaintiff took the note
as the obligation of the corporation. The higher court, following
former decisions, affirmed this ruling. Two of the justices, how-
ever, dissented, contending that the preponderance of authority
was in favor of the admissibility of parol evidence, in an action
between the original parties to a bill or note of this character, to
show that both parties to the instrument intended it to be the
obligation of the corporation. There certainly was enough upon
the face of the note to make it doubtful whether it was intended
as a personal or a corporate note. This being true there would
seem to be good reason for admitting parol evidence as to its true
character, especially in a suit between the maker and the payee.
This is the view taken by a large number of authorities. Some of
the cases go even further and hold that a note like the one upon
which the Iowa case was brought is not doubtful on its face but is
the obligation of the corporation alone. The point involved is
one upon which the decisions are so decidedly conflicting that it
would be useless to endeavor to reconcile them. What one court
would call mere descriptio personx, is enough to cause another court
to admit parol evidence to remove a patent ambiguity. Plain
proof -if proof were needed -that different judges see the same
thing in different lights, and that upon some points the decisions
of our courts can never b'e wholly consistent.
The case of State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, so often quoted and
criticised as authority for the doctrine that jurors in criminal cases
are paramount judges of the law as well as of the facts, has at
last been expressly overruled. Thus disappears as a right of com-
mon law a doctrine originally idopted in the colonies as a safe-
guard against the arbitrary acts of judges appointed by the
English Crown, and which has gradually been abandoned, since
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our independence was gained and the reason for the rule disap-
peared. It remains the law, however, in five or six American
States, under stress of constitutional or legislative provisions.
The overruling opinion (State v. Burpee, 25 Atl. Rep. 964) after
an exhaustive review of the English and American authorities
sums up as follows: "We are thus led to the conclusion that the
doctrine that jurors are the judges of the law in criminal cases is
untenable; that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the
common law from which it is claimed to take its origin; contrary
to the uniform practice and decisions of the courts of Great Brit-
ain, where our jury system had its beginning, and where it
matured; contrary to the great weight of authority in this country;
contrary to the spirit and meaning of the Constitution of the
United States; repugnant to the constitution" and statutes of the
State of Vermont, and, quoting from another opinion, "contrary
to reason and fitness in withdrawing the interpretation of the laws
.from those who make it the business and the study of their lives
to understand them, and committing it to a class of men who,
being drawn from non-professional life for occasional and tempo-
rary service only, possess no such qualification, and whose decision
would be certain to be conflicting in all doubtful cases, and would
therefore lead to endless confusion and perpetual uncertainty."
In an opinion on the appeal of Sidney Lascelles the Supreme
Court of the United States has just decided that a prisoner extra-
dited from another State may be tried for a crime not mentioned
in the requisition papers. This has long been a mooted question
and there have been decisions on both sides in the State courts,
the most recent of which were noticed in the last number of this
JOURNAL, page 164. This is the first time that the question has
come before the United States Supreme Court, and its decision
will probably go far toward settling the rule, especially as it
would seem to be supported by the weight of reason and author-
ity.
